



NOTTINGHAMSHIRE
Fire & Rescue Service
Creating Safer Communities

Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham
Fire and Rescue Authority

GRENFELL INQUIRY – PHASE ONE REPORT

Report of the Chief Fire Officer

Date: 20 December 2019

Purpose of Report:

To present Members with the Service's response to the Grenfell incident and the publication of the Phase One report from the Public Inquiry.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that Members:

- Endorse the approach being taken by the Chief Fire Officer to address the outcomes of the Grenfell Phase One report.
- Agree to receive updates in relation to further action, associated with the Grenfell Inquiry, through the Community Safety Committee.

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1. BACKGROUND

- 1.1 On 14 June 2017, a fire occurred at Grenfell Tower, London, which destroyed the 24-storey block of 129 residential flats. Seventy-two people lost their lives at the incident.
- 1.2 The presence of aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding was determined as a key component in the cause of the rapid fire spread on the exterior of the property, whilst failings in relation to compartmentation and fire engineered safety solutions were highlighted as allowing internal fire spread.
- 1.3 The Right Honourable Sir Martin Moore-Bick was appointed as Chairman of the public inquiry; set up to examine the circumstances leading up to, and surrounding, the fire at Grenfell Tower.
- 1.4 The inquiry was formulated over two phases; Phase One relating to the occurrences immediately surrounding the incident (including the cause of the fire and emergency response) and Phase Two focussing on broader areas that enabled the conditions for this incident to occur (including building regulations and the renovation of the tower block).
- 1.5 The Phase One report was published on 30 October 2019. The first part of the report focused on three main areas;
 - An account of the building, its surroundings and the standard working practices of London Fire Brigade (LFB);
 - A detailed description of events on 14 June 2017 including events within the Tower and action by emergency services, the council and the Tenant Management Organisation;
 - Conclusions about the fire and fire spread, the actions by emergency services, systemic failings of LFB, and failings in the fire safety regulations applied to the refurbishment of the building.
- 1.6 The second part of the Phase One report pays tribute to those who lost their lives in the fire and makes recommendations which can be dissected in to three audiences: LFB directly, the wider fire sector and emergency services, and other responsible persons such as building owners, Government and Local Authorities.
- 1.7 The Home Office and the National Fire Chiefs' Council (NFCC) are currently considering the report and have yet to issue a response. NFCC has expressed the importance of a co-ordinated response, across the Sector, to avoid localised developments outside of a national framework, duplicated effort or different solutions between fire and rescue services.

- 1.8 The Phase One report is extensive, therefore a link to the document is provided below, and copies of the Phase One Report Overview will be available at the meeting.

<https://assets.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/GTI%20-%20Phase%201%20report%20Executive%20Summary.pdf>

2. REPORT

- 2.1 Prior to the publication of the Grenfell Phase One report, the Service has undertaken a number of steps to mitigate the risks posed by buildings which presented similar risks to those which were faced at the Grenfell fire.
- 2.2 Liaison with Nottingham City Council (NCC) has enabled identification of eight buildings which were believed to be clad with ACM. Advice and support has been offered to responsible persons at the premises and continuing liaison has occurred between the Service's Fire Protection Inspecting Officers, Environmental Health Officers and Housing Teams to monitor and support the developing situation.
- 2.3 Two premises remain in the City area that meet the framework for intervention. Both sites have managed solutions and continue to receive support from the Service and Local Authority.
- 2.4 Each of the identified premises has a specific, risk based, pre-determined attendance of appliances to mitigate the risks posed by a fire at these premises. Operational crews have also gathered risk information for each of the premises, with recurring visits arranged for each location to maintain current and accurate information.
- 2.5 Additionally, the Service has seconded a Fire Protection Inspecting Officer to work within the Community Protection Team at NCC, on a full-time basis for one year, to focus upon multi-occupancy residential buildings which fall outside the scope of the actions taken post-Grenfell (ie: below 18 metres), but that could still present a risk.
- 2.6 Since the publication of the Phase One report, the Service has engaged locally, regionally and nationally - with Local Authorities, neighbouring fire and rescue services and the NFCC – to ensure a consistent and effective response to its recommendations.
- 2.7 The Service has held Serious Event Review Group (SERG) meetings since the Grenfell incident, to capture key learning and implement required changes to Service procedures. This has included bespoke high-rise training for crews and establishing a High-Rise Working Group to review policies and procedures in relation to training and operations.
- 2.8 A further SERG meeting was held on 9 December to specifically look at the enactment of recommendations from the Phase One report. This will include

a collaborative approach with Derbyshire Fire and Rescue Service and will support any future recommendations, specifically for the Joint Fire Control and operational procedures. A summary of the recommendations from the Phase One report, which are relevant to the Service, are detailed in Appendix A of this report.

- 2.9 The Service is utilising the embedded networks with regional fire and rescue services, in relation to operational guidance and training, to ensure a consistent, sustainable approach is adopted, which reflects the national guidance from NFCC and the Central Programme Office.
- 2.10 The Grenfell incident has also triggered a number of national reviews in relation to fire safety regulation. The Service is actively involved in regional NFCC Fire Protection working groups, is actively engaged in national developments and has responded to all consultations on proposed changes; including building regulations, competency standards and proposals in relation to the fitting of sprinklers in new and refurbished buildings.
- 2.11 Some recommendations from the Phase One report are already progressing nationally. For example, a Government-led steering group has been established on 'Stay Put' and emergency evacuation procedures, the NFCC Operations Committee is exploring the use of 'Smoke Hoods' to assist casualty evacuation, and work is underway through the NFCC to develop a 'foundation document' for Control operations. Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service continues to support these areas of development through regional, and national, working and will maintain awareness of developments; progressing areas regionally where appropriate.
- 2.12 The Home Office, in conjunction with the NFCC, has put in place an assurance framework to enable ongoing report and collation of data nationally on ACM clad buildings. The Service is fully engaged in this process.

3. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no financial implications arising from this report.

4. HUMAN RESOURCES AND LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

There are no human resources or learning and development implications arising from this report.

5. EQUALITIES IMPLICATIONS

There are no equalities implications arising from this report as no changes to existing, or introduction of new arrangements of the delivery of services, are proposed.

6. CRIME AND DISORDER IMPLICATIONS

There are no crime and disorder implications arising from this report.

7. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no legal implications arising from this report, however Members should be aware that proposed changes to fire safety legislation, and statutory requirements of the fire and rescue services, may have a future impact on the resourcing requirements of the Service.

8. RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

Learning from local and national incidents is essential to ensure the Service continues to mitigate the risk presented by fire to both communities and employees. The co-ordinated response with local partners, and the wider fire sector, is designed to ensure that a proportionate, risk-based approach to actions concerning fire spread in the built environment is adopted.

9. COLLABORATION IMPLICATIONS

There are no collaboration implications arising from this report, however, the Service is working with Nottingham City Council in addressing the risks posed by multi-occupancy residential buildings in the city area. Additionally, the Service will continue to work with Derbyshire Fire and Rescue Service in the enactment of recommendations from the Phase One report.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that Members:

- 10.1 Endorse the approach being taken by the Chief Fire Officer to address the outcomes of the Grenfell Phase One report.
- 10.2 Agree to receive updates in relation to further action associated with the Grenfell Inquiry through the Community Safety Committee.

11. BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR INSPECTION (OTHER THAN PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS)

None.

John Buckley
CHIEF FIRE OFFICER

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM GRENFELL PHASE ONE REPORT

Phase 1 Report – Overview		
Ref	Page No	Recommendation/Consideration
1	12 (33.5)	Provision of a greater range of responses to high-rise building fires, including consideration of full or partial evacuation.
2	13 (33.10)	All personnel, at all levels, understand the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and know how to recognise when it occurs.
3	14 (33.11)	Review Policy to ensure it reflects the principles in GRA 3.2 (fighting fires in high rise buildings) and that training is provided to Crew Managers, and above, relating to inspection of high rise buildings.
4	14 (33.12)	Responsible person to provide hard copy, and electronic copy, plans of every floor of all high-rise residential buildings to the FRS and that the FRS has a mechanism to make these plans available to incident commanders and control room managers.
5	14 (33.13)	Responsible person to report monthly test of firefighting lifts and control mechanisms to the FRS.
6	15 (33.14) (33.15) (33.16)	Twelve individual recommendations in relation to communications between the control room and the incident commander, the handling of emergency calls, the provision of fire survival guidance and the transfer of calls and caller information between emergency services.

Phase 1 Report – Overview

Ref	Page No	Recommendation/Consideration
7	16 (33.18) (33.19)	<p>Develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources.</p> <p>Develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room).</p> <p>Ensure that systems are available for direct communication between the control room and incident commander.</p>
8	16 (33.20) (33.21)	<p>Provide equipment that enables FFs and control rooms to communicate directly with the bridgehead; including the equipment to enable FFs wearing breathing apparatus and helmets to communicate effectively.</p>
9	17 (33.21)	<p>Ensure the command support system is fully operative on all command units and that crews are trained in its use.</p>
10	17 (33.22)	<p>That FRSs develop policies for partial and total evacuation of high-rise buildings and training to support them, and that building owners provide hard, and electronic, copies of evacuation plans.</p>
11	17 (33.22)	<p>All FRSs be equipped with smoke hoods to assist in the evacuation of occupants through smoke filled exit routes.</p>
12	19 (33.31) (33.32) (33.33) (33.34)	<p>Seven individual recommendations related to the compatibility of emergency service's systems and the sharing of information during a declared 'major' incident.</p>
13	22 (34.5)	<p>Although not a direct recommendation, the Chairman makes strong comments about LFB's ability to learn from, and put into practice, lessons from events.</p>